Non-Governmental Organisations and the European Union’s Promotion of Human Rights in China: NGO Influence or NO Influence? College of Europe EU Diplomacy Papers, 4/2010 by Hansen, Camilla.
www.coleurope.eu
Department of EU International 
Relations and Diplomacy Studies
EU Diplomacy  
Papers
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 / 2010
Non-Governmental Organisations and the  
European Union’s Promotion of Human Rights in 
China: NGO Influence or NO Influence?
Camilla Hansen 
 
Department of EU International Relations 
and Diplomacy Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
E EU U   D Di ip pl lo om ma ac cy y   P Pa ap pe er rs s   
4 4/ /2 20 01 10 0 
 
 
 
 
Non-Governmental Organisations and  
the European Union’s Promotion of  
Human Rights in China:  
NGO Influence or NO Influence? 
 
Camilla Hansen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Camilla Hansen 2010 
 
 
Dijver 11 | BE-8000 Bruges, Belgium | Tel. +32 (0)50 477 251 | Fax +32 (0)50 477 250 | 
E-mail info.ird@coleurope.eu | www.coleurope.eu/ird  Camilla Hansen 
About the Author 
 
Camilla Hansen holds a Master’s degree in Public Administration and Management 
(2008) from the Institut d’études politiques of Bordeaux, France, which included an 
exchange year at the National Sun Yat-sen University in Kaohsiung, Taiwan (2006). In 
2008, she carried out a traineeship in the Cabinet of Mariann Fischer Boel, European 
Commission, before entering the College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium, where she 
completed an MA in European Political and Administrative Studies (Marcus Aurelius 
Promotion 2009). She is currently working as Policy Assistant Government Affairs at 
Johnson & Johnson in Brussels, Belgium. This paper is based on her Master’s thesis 
submitted at the College of Europe, which received the 2009 award for the best 
thesis on EU-China relations of the InBev-Baillet Latour Chair of European Union-China 
Relations.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Editorial Team: 
Benjamin Barton, André Ghione, Sieglinde Gstöhl, Dieter Mahncke, Jing Men, Anne-
Claire Marangoni, Hugo Palma, Shannon Petry  
Dijver 11 | BE-8000 Bruges, Belgium | Tel. +32 (0)50 477 251 | Fax +32 (0)50 477 250 | 
E-mail info.ird@coleurope.eu | www.coleurope.eu/ird  
Views expressed in the EU Diplomacy Papers are those of the authors only and do 
not necessarily reflect positions of either the series editors or the College of Europe.  
  2 EU Diplomacy Paper 4/2010 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines whether lobbying the European Union’s institutions by non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), concerning respect and defence of human 
rights in China, has a measurable impact on the EU decision-making framework of 
promoting human rights in China. This is especially interesting at a time when this very 
framework is in a relative crisis and the EU is struggling to overcome its democratic 
deficit. Relying on Paul A. Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework, the paper 
argues that although the influence of NGOs has increased over recent years and 
they know where to turn for their lobbying efforts, they do not have a de facto 
impact on EU policy-making regarding human rights in China. In order to increase 
influence on the EU, NGOs should come together in sub-groups and broader trans-
sector coalitions. Furthermore, they should predominantly concentrate on the scope 
of rights and issues defended – as should the EU –, so as to strengthen both 
coherence and overall convergence of strategies. Finally, the paper questions the 
current attitude of the EU with regard to China and suggests a modification of both 
European and Chinese mind patterns in order to enhance the level of receptiveness 
of NGO inputs.  
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“Today, political leaders throughout Europe are facing a real 
paradox. On the one hand, Europeans want them to find 
solutions to the major problems confronting our societies. On the 
other hand, people increasingly distrust institutions and politics 
or are simply not interested in them.”1 
 
 
1. Introduction: NGO Influence or NO Influence? 
 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were among the first to react to the human 
rights situation in China after the country’s progressive opening to the rest of the 
world following the reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in the 1970s. Assisted by heavy 
media coverage, NGOs played a key role in conveying the need to act to the 
European Union (EU) after the incidents on Tiananmen Square on 4 June 1989. The 
wake-up call was rather abrupt for the EU institutions and member states, but 
occurred at a moment of the integration process where technocratic expertise no 
longer was deemed sufficient to pretend democratic legitimacy. Hence, NGOs and 
the EU embarked on a journey with different means of traveling but the same 
destination: improving the human rights record of China or, paraphrasing the 
European Commission’s White Paper on Governance of 2001, finding a solution to 
China’s human rights situation using the strength of both the EU (relying on its 
capability of raising issues at the highest political level) and NGOs (bridging the 
technocratic institutions with its citizens).2 
I f  h i s t o r i c a l l y  “ t h e  T r e a t y  o f  R o m e  w a s  s i l e n t  o n  t h e  r o l e  o f  n o n - p r o f i t  
organizations under EU law“3, this legal reality has not prevented such organisations 
from creating alternative means to communicate with European policy makers. On 
the journey towards strengthened respect for human rights in China their role 
appears of significant importance. Yet they still represent a minority amongst 
lobbyists in Brussels: there are today approximately 15,000 lobbyists in Brussels – “45% 
of these groups represent industry, and 11% NGOs, meaning that NGOs often feel 
smothered by the relative weight industry is able to bring to bear”.4 However, they 
are nonetheless frequently being called upon by the EU institutions in search of both 
input and output legitimacy and expertise. In this perspective, the aim of this paper is 
                                                 
1 Commission of the European Communities, White Paper on European Governance, Brussels, 
25 July 2001, Executive Summary, http://ec.europa.eu/civil_society/consultation_standards/ 
index_en.htm#_Toc46744741, retrieved 3 March 2009. 
2 Ibid. 
3 O.B. Breen, “EU Regulation of Charitable Organizations: The Politics of Legally Enabling Civil 
Society”, International Journal of Not for Profit Law, vol. 10, no. 3, 2008, p. 61. 
4 J. Lee, Comparing NGO Influence in the EU and the U.S., CASIN, Kigali, Rwanda, September 
2006, p. 1. 
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to evaluate the influence of NGOs on the EU decision-making framework of 
promoting human rights in China. Several questions underpin this objective: What are 
the human rights issues that Brussels-based NGOs focus the most of their lobbying 
ac tivities o n in the E U  institu tio ns? T o what extent does their choice of promoting 
specific rights, cases or broader issues affect the European stands? To what extent 
do NGOs intervene in the shaping of EU policies and discourse on the promotion of 
human rights in China? How do they influence the institutional decision-making 
system of the EU and, eventually, to what extent does the EU make use of the 
expertise from NGOs when influencing China within the field of human rights? 
In order to provide a satisfactory answer to these questions, the paper refers to 
the basic scheme provided by the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) model of 
Paul A. Sabatier.5 I have altered the model into a three-dimensional tool by adding a 
third criterion, serving as the ‘red line’ in assessing the role and effectiveness of 
NGOs. The three dimensions are: (1) coalition-building, (2) convergence on policy 
objectives and, as an addition to Sabatier’s framework, (3) mutual receptiveness of 
the actors involved.  
My hypothesis is that while NGOs attempt, through traditional interest 
representation channels, to promote specific human rights, they do not have a de 
facto impact on EU policy-making on human rights in China. Indeed, given the multi-
layeredness and complexity of the EU, they are unable to address the right policy 
makers, or they do not spread sufficient information to national constituencies 
and/or these have other, stronger interests which prevent them from acting on 
human rights (that is, Realpolitik). Indeed, the EU only seems half-open to the causes 
put forth by NGOs. Given China’s spectacular rise, the EU abides by the Napoleonic 
prediction, “when China awakes, the world will tremble”,6 putting economic interests 
above human rights, so as not to upset an influential player on the scene of world 
politics. 
For the purpose of this paper, two facts are taken as given: that the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) has a serious human rights issue7 and that the EU member 
states recognise this fact and would like to see the situation ameliorated.8 It has 
been found that human rights are indivisible and should be taken as universal - they 
                                                 
5 P.A. Sabatier, “The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Revisions and Relevance for Europe”, 
Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 5, no. 1, 1998, pp. 98-130. 
6 A. Peyrefitte, Quand la Chine s'éveillera ... le monde tremblera : regards sur la voie chinoise, 
Paris, Fayard, 1973 (author’s translation). 
7 See China’s human rights record, www.amnesty.org.uk/content.asp?CategoryID=11204, 
retrieved on 6 April 2009. 
8 P. Baker, “Human Rights, Europe and the People’s Republic of China”, The China Quarterly, 
no. 169, 2002, p. 2. 
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can be approached in different ways, but never ranked or prioritised. The definition 
of human rights on which this paper is relying falls under this idea, i.e. human rights 
are understood as being universal. When reference is made to human rights in this 
paper, human rights are understood as defined in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), that is, the right to life, freedom from torture, freedom from arbitrary arrest 
and freedom of speech. The counterargument that other basic rights, namely socio-
economic rights (or as put forth by a Chinese official, “collective rights”9) should be 
given priority seems far from satisfactory. Indeed, none of the ‘categories’ of human 
rights are incompatible but rather mutually reinforcing.10  
NGOs are independent international civil society bodies. For the purpose of 
this paper only NGOs with a seat in Brussels and of significant size are considered. The 
organisations involved are thus: Amnesty International (AI), Fédération Internationale 
des Droits de l’Homme (FIDH), Human Rights Watch (HRW), Human Rights Without 
Frontiers (HRWF), International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) and Réporteurs Sans 
Frontières (RSF). To give as broad a picture as possible, Human Rights in China (HRIC), 
though no longer disposing of an office in Brussels, as well as the World Uyghur 
Congress (WUC – based in Munich, Germany) are also considered. 
As for the definition of ‘influence’, it is seen as the capacity to shape the 
official position of the EU on human rights issues in China; the presence in the 
institutional decision-making framework and the extent to which the NGOs are being 
both listened to and respected by the EU institutions. The lack of science-based 
evaluations when assessing similar situations constitutes a major problem. Hence, the 
paper primarily deals with the analysis and comparisons of official statements and 
reports as well as informal declarations from both NGO staff and EU officials.  
Finally, the EU decision-making framework of promoting human rights in China 
is mainly understood as the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue, established between 
the EU troika and Chinese officials in 1995 and held twice a year. Special attention 
will be paid to the legal expert seminars, organised over two days before the 
beginning of the official dialogue in which civil society is invited to bring inputs. One 
year after the organisation of the legal expert seminars was reverted from the 
European Commission to the Irish Centre for Human Rights, NUI Galway (effective as 
                                                 
9 Discussion in Bruges with Dr. Wang Yiwei, Second Secretary, Chinese Mission to the EU in 
Brussels, 25 March 2009. 
10 Baker, op.cit., p. 2. 
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of January 200911), this is a timely opportunity to examine the current state of the 
framework as both, the EU and China, begin to show signs of exasperation.12 
Additionally, official statements from each of the institutions in question will also be 
taken into account as a means of putting pressure on the Chinese authorities.13  
The paper will first outline an analytical and conceptual approach to NGOs 
within EU-policy-making (section 2) and then test the three criteria in the subsequent 
chapters: coalition (section 3), convergence of discourses and objectives of both the 
EU and NGOs (section 4), and receptiveness of the EU to NGO lobbying, and of 
NGOs to China, in specific cases (section 5). Finally, the conclusions will, given the 
problematic nature of the issue at hand, reiterate the main findings of the paper and 
outline my perception of the evolution of EU-China relations with respect to human 
rights (section 6). 
 
2. Interest Representation and Lobbying: a Theoretical Approach to NGOs 
within EU Human Rights Policy-making  
 
This section turns to the EU’s three main institutions – the European Parliament, the 
European Commission and the Council of Ministers – and the implications of this 
institutional division for NGO work. 
 
2.1  Institutional Divisions within the EU: Challenge to NGOs 
The European Parliament is by far the “most outspoken”14 of the three institutions. It is 
particularly receptive to NGOs and frequent exchanges – bringing highly valued 
inputs15 – are organised, thereby maintaining good relations and building mutual 
trust. Yet the European Parliament takes a rather ambiguous position towards 
NGOs:16 the complex relationship between the European Parliament and civil society 
“is borne of the continued assertion of the status of representative democracy 
above that of participatory democracy”.17 However, opportunity structures and 
                                                 
11 For more information see The EU-China Human Rights Network, NUI Galway, 
www.nuigalway.ie/human_rights/projects/euchina.html, retrieved 15 February 2009. 
12 Fédération Internationale des Droits de l’Homme & Human Rights in China, Joint Assessment 
of the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue and Legal Expert Seminars, 8 December 2008. 
13 See resolutions voted by the European Parliament, prizes and awards granted to human 
rights defenders, joint communiqués in all areas with possible effects on human rights. 
14 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 24 March 2009. 
15 Interview with G. Harris, Human Rights Unit, European Parliament, Brussels, 16 March 2009. 
16 J. Greenwood, “Transnational Institutions and Civil Society Organisations in the EU’s 
Multilevel System”, in J. Joachim & B. Locher (eds.), Transnational Activism in the UN and the 
EU – A Comparative Study, London, Routledge, 2009, pp. 93-102. 
17 Ibid. 
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“vigorous operational relations through the two worlds”18 exist. Moreover, if the 
European Parliament for a long time was reduced to more of a spectator, at the 
edge of the former institutional tandem, the legislative modifications made over the 
last twenty years – most significantly since December 2009 with the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty – have raised its credentials and possibilities for influence 
significantly. Whilst some NGOs underline that although “parliamentarian resolutions 
can have an impact and positive effects in third countries [...] the European 
Parliament is not able to convey its positions to the other institutions, reducing its role 
to one rather similar to that of an NGO”19,  the European Parliament remains the 
easiest to access and the one who speaks out, particularly on human rights.20  
According to an EU official, “the doors of the Commission are always open to 
NGOs”.21 The need for strengthened legitimacy is crucial to the wide-open doors of 
the Commission when it comes to NGOs. Indeed, as stressed by a paper published 
by the British Federal Trust for Education and Research, “citizens often criticize the 
Commission for being too bureaucratic and for producing complex legislation”.22 A 
recent Eurobarometer survey shows “that one in two Europeans consider the EU to 
be ‘technocratic’ (49%) and ‘inefficient’(43%)”.23  
In short, it seems obvious that the so-called Monnet legacy, that is, “a de-
politicised functionalist bureaucracy designed to pursue the common interests of 
European citizens”,24 has exposed the Commission to justified criticisms of 
democratic deficits. Turning towards civil society thus seems an unavoidable 
measure in order to increase legitimacy and show that the Commission is not only 
looking inwards. Moreover, the Commission lacks human resources and experts on 
various issues, disposing, instead, of a significant staff of well-educated ‘generalists’. 
According to Katrin Kinzelbach (Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights in 
Vienna), the Commission clearly “lacks true China experts”.25 The knowledge gap 
thus created is very likely to be filled by reports and other inputs from NGOs. As it 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
19 Interview with S. Dennison, AI, Brussels, 17 March 2009. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Interview with an EU official, op.cit., 24 March 2009. 
22 Federal Trust for Education and Research, The Role of the European Commission, Discussion 
Paper, no. 4, for the Federal Trust Working Group  on “Democracy, Legitimacy and 
Accountability in the EU”, www.fedtrust.co.uk/admin/uploads/FedT_Discussion_Paper_4.pdf, 
retrieved 26 April 2009. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 K. Kinzelbach, “EU Human Rights Policy towards China: Normative Partnership or 
Antagonism in Disguise?”, presentation at the workshop “Prospects and Challenges for EU-
China Relations in the 21st Century: The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement”, College of 
Europe, Bruges, 3-4 April 2009. 
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stands, the Commission seems to need NGOs, just as much as NGOs need this 
institution to convey their messages at a political level. 
r COREPER. 
                                                
Of the three institutions, the Council of Ministers remains the least accessible to 
NGOs because “Council sessions are on the whole secret, and documents are not 
readily released […] There are no formalised consultations between COREPER and 
the NGOs, but there are more and more informal consultations in order to make 
allowance for current affairs in society at large”.26 In the same vein, it is noteworthy 
to highlight that a recent review of the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue, 
commanded by the Council Secretariat, has not been made publicly available.27 
However, these facts do not prevent NGOs from trying to influence policy processes 
through, for instance, national governments, the Council Presidency o
According to a member of RSF, the Council represents the main obstacle to 
NGO influence. Indeed, it “listens to what suits it, adopting a cowardice attitude, 
where economy and financial profit are ranked highest; in sum, an attitude with 
Realpolitik as guidelines”.28 As much as one might find common ground in such a 
statement, it is nevertheless important to bear in mind that patience and pragmatism 
must prevail when dealing with diplomacy - at least to a certain extent. However, in 
order to curb this stand, possibly seen as a ‘necessary evil’ by more than one actor 
involved in EU foreign policy-making, and to avoid Realpolitik at too many latitudes, 
NGO input might be the answer. 
Furthermore, the very nature of the Council encourages potentially 
inconsistent positions and policies. The problems ensued from the rotating 
Presidencies should in this respect be noted. For instance, the French Presidency of 
2008, on which many NGOs had placed high hopes in terms of progress and 
defence of human rights, turned out to be “deceiving”29; the Czech Presidency of 
2009 had issues at the domestic level (change of government) and, for the recent 
Swedish Presidency, climate discussions ahead of COP15 (Copenhagen, December 
2009) were the main focus. Added to this, priorities are not always in line, even within 
the units of the Council dealing with human rights. Besides, as put forth by a Council 
official, these units are themselves “internal NGOs”,30 in that they also lack significant 
influence. As for the COHOM, the working party on human rights within the Council, 
which meets once a month, it has closer links to the member states. Although it is 
 
26 “DEsite/DEcide”, Tilburg University Library and Tilburg University Faculty of Law, 
http://drcwww.uvt.nl/dbi/instructie/eu/en/T32.htm, retrieved on 26 April 2009. 
27 Phone interview with S. Dennison, AI, 4 February 2010. 
28 Interview with O. Basille, Director General, RSF, Brussels, 24 March 2009. 
29 Interview with S. Dennison, AI, 17 March 2009, op.cit. 
30 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 31 March 2009. 
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mainly consensus-driven, it appears both quite consistent and more open to outside 
influences than other units of the Council, showing signs of good cooperation with 
the Commission, the Council, the European Parliament and NGOs.31 
Finally, even though the majority of the NGOs surveyed continue to focus 
more extensively on the European Parliament and the Commission, recent trends 
show that the organisations disposing of sufficient resources and staff increasingly 
turn towards the ‘epicentre’ of EU decision-making on human rights – the Council. 
For instance, AI today predominantly focuses on the Council and already enjoys 
quite an established way of feeding in.32 
 
2.2  Consequences and Effects on the Work of NGOs 
The internal divide among the EU institutions, in terms of both access of and 
receptiveness to NGOs, constitutes a noteworthy hurdle to human rights engaged 
civil society. As underlined by Willy Fautré from HRWF, “the internal divisions within the 
EU make it all the more difficult to influence and approach the institutions”.33  
Given the nature of the European Parliament, being more open to outside 
input, the majority of the NGOs focus their efforts on this institution. However, the 
most structured and best staffed among the organisations increasingly turn towards 
the Council as well. This fact evidently ‘penalises’ smaller NGOs, such as RSF.  
Moreover, the differences between the institutions and the often rapid 
rotation of staff within the EU generate difficulties when assessing whom to address as 
a priority. This is mainly because the interaction between civil society and the EU 
institutions on human rights promotion in China largely remains based on informal 
contacts, even when unfolding under the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue. Yet, 
even if the personnel might change, the posts and functions stay the same. 
Another concern is that of the institutionalisation of NGOs, which might lead to 
a decrease in independence. The Commission’s relatively strong need for NGO input 
– explained notably by their lack of resources, as stressed by Nugent34, who argues 
that the EU institutions employ 0,8 members of staff for every 10.000 European 
citizens, set against 300 per 10.000 in the individual member states – contains a risk of 
making the NGOs grow dependent on the institutions. Greenwood writes in this 
regard that “whilst civil society input can enhance output legitimacy, it is 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Interview with S. Dennison, AI, 17 March 2009, op.cit. 
33 Interview with W. Fautré, HRWF, Brussels, 24 March 2009. 
34 N. Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006, 6th edn., chapter 9 and in particular  p. 159. 
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conceivable that the involved organisations may grow dependent upon the support 
of the EU”.35 However, various NGOs unsurprisingly deny this – a denial which is often 
nuanced, that is, they all underline the need to adopt a constructive attitude, which 
is not radically opposed to that of the EU, in order for them to have their word to say. 
“NGOs try to be as independent as possible, but must play the EU’s cards in order to 
be constructive”.36 
To work on, and potentially with, the EU institutions is thus a matter of mutual 
trust; a question of not being bound by the EU policy in the given area, but rather 
‘playing the game’ in order to increase the chances of influence.37 
 
2.3  Theorising NGOs within the EU: the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
In order to better picture and analyse the situation outlined above, a theoretical tool 
is needed. Sabatier’s ACF model, which is “ t h e  m o s t  u s e f u l  u n i t  o f  a n a l y s i s  f o r  
understanding the overall policy process in modern industrial societies”,38 seems 
appropriate. The ACF-model argues that actors increase their chances of influence 
when aggregating in ‘advocacy coalitions’ in which they share the same core 
policy beliefs as the other members and hence appear coherent and consistent in 
their discourses on the causes defended. Breen writes in a similar way concerning the 
appropriateness of using coalition-building as “an alternative lens […] through which 
to view NGO/EU institutional relations”.39  
Two criteria are taken from the ACF: (1) coalition and (2) coherence and 
convergence on policies and causes defended. An additional criterion concerns the 
specific issue of the EU’s human rights policy toward China: (3) mutual receptiveness 
of the actors involved. In order to demonstrate the observations on the relationship 
of NGOs within the EU, while demonstrating their interaction with China, this paper 
will focus on the strategies of the NGOs involved, the issues they cover and how their 
actions, in return, are received and treated by the EU institutions.  
Hence, the original criteria extorted from the ACF model are applied 
horizontally (the coalition between NGOs, the coalition within the EU institutions, and 
the convergence in both entities on causes defended), while the third criterion will 
                                                 
35 Greenwood, op.cit., p. 98. 
36 Interview with A. Madelin, Fédération Internationale des Droits de l’Homme, Brussels, 31 
March 2009. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Sabatier, op.cit., p. 7. 
39 O.B. Breen, The Potential for Partnership – NGO Involvement in the European Policy and 
Decision-Making Process, Summary of research, New Haven, CT, Yale Law School, 2003, p. 1. 
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be applied vertically (the degree of receptiveness by the EU to NGO lobbying and 
the degree of EU openness and NGO openness to China and Chinese perceptions).  
  In the following sections, the main findings of my research, largely based on 
interviews with officials and NGO representatives in Brussels, will be outlined. 
However, due to space restrictions, many descriptive parts have been left out.40 
 
3.   Presence of NGOs within the Shaping of EU Human Rights Promotion in 
China: Increased Influence through Coalition-building?  
 
3.1   Points of Convergence with the ACF: Coalitions or Institutionalised Groups 
First of all, it should be noted that if not necessarily grouped in official coalitions, the 
majority of the NGOs involved, which claim to have any influence at all, are 
institutionalised, that is, well-established, of significant size and known as reliable by 
the EU institutions. Like in any other sector, making oneself heard and seen is crucial. 
Thus, it seems far from insipid that Amnesty International, one of the biggest NGOs, 
has its premises in the heart of the European quarter of Brussels, or that RSF – 
probably the smallest of size – has decided to locate its office a step away from the 
Council of Ministers.  
As for coalition-building properly speaking, the FIDH, in its function of ‘umbrella 
organisation’, is the most telling example. It explicitly aims at coordinating the action 
of various groups, so-called ‘leagues’, specialised in the field of human rights. In 
doing so, it becomes a ‘spring-board’ for many small NGOs lacking the necessary 
resources to be heard within the context of the EU institutions. Thus, ICT has in spring 
2009 made the demand for affiliation to FIDH, finding it “very important to cooperate 
with other NGOs”.41 A s  f o r  H R I C ,  d i s p o s i n g  n o  l o n g e r  o f  a n  o f f i c e  i n  B r u s s e l s  a n d  
having been ‘blacklisted’ by both the EU and the Chinese authorities (judged too 
controversial since the Human Rights Dialogue in Berlin 2007), it has been taken 
‘under the wings’ of FIDH when it comes to representation within the EU.42 It is also 
worth mentioning that FIDH – alongside AI, HRW and RSF – is itself a member of the 
Human Rights and Democracy Network (HRDN), an informal grouping of NGOs 
operating at EU level in the broader areas of human rights, democracy and conflict 
                                                 
40 For more details see C. Hansen, The Influence of NGOs on the EU Decision-making 
Framework of Promoting Human Rights in China: True NGO Impact Fostering European 
Influence in the Middle Kingdom or Continuous Ddialogue of the Deaf? Master’s thesis, 
Bruges, College of Europe, 2009. 
41 Interview with V. Metten, ICT, Brussels, 27 April 2009. 
42 See Fédération Internationale des Droits de l’Homme & Human Rights in China, Joint 
Assessment of the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue and Legal Expert Seminars, op.cit. 
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prevention.43 The network outlines specifically that it “aims to influence EU and 
member state human rights policies and the programming of their funding 
instruments to promote democracy [and] human rights”.44 While the HRDN does not 
represent its members as a uniform group with shared interests at all times, it 
constitutes a tool for information sharing and offers a framework for ad hoc coalitions 
on concrete projects.45 
Thus, one specific condition for influence is clear: regular contacts between 
NGOs are crucial in order to follow developments both in China and within the EU 
decision-making framework and, thereby, intervene and try to make a difference. 
However, not every network functions optimally. According to ICT, “the main network 
remains the FIDH”.46 On punctual cases, the NGOs equally turn to groups and 
networks established outside the Brussels sanctuary. In the search of expertise and 
world-wide support, with the aim of further increasing the potential influence within 
the EU, every contact is of value. Thus, ICT has in 2009 begun to cooperate more 
closely with the ‘World Coalition against the Death Penalty’.47 Indeed, after the 
sentencing to death of five Tibetans in the aftermath of the upheaval in March 2008, 
the organisation has turned to external means to fight for its cause.48 The WUC works 
since the 1970s with other minority defenders. Indeed, “given that [they] all suffer 
from Chinese oppression, [they] have eventually created a united committee 
defending the causes of Oriental Turkestan/Interior Mongolia/Tibet in 1991”.49 
Thus, amongst NGOs the first criterion of the analytical scheme can be 
verified. Indeed, in order to increase their influence, NGOs present in Brussels or 
interested in conveying their ideas to the EU institutions rely on regular contacts and 
coordination skills from at least one umbrella organisation. This allows them to cover 
more issues than by working alone and enhances their credibility vis-à-vis the 
institutional actors.  
                                                 
43 The Human Rights and Democracy Network (HRDN), part of the EU Civil Society Contact 
Group, established in 2002, www.act4europe.org/code/en/about.asp?Page=41&menu 
Page=41, retrieved on 3 March 2010. See also D. Gueguen, European Lobbying, London, 
John Harper Publishing, 2008, 3rd edn., pp. 50-58. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Interview with V. Metten, op.cit. 
47 World Coalition against the Death Penalty, www.worldcoalition.org/modules/accueil, 
retrieved on 15 April 2009. 
48 International Campaign for Tibet, “Fifth Tibetan Sentenced to Death”, 
www.savetibet.org/media-center/ict-news-reports/fifth-tibetan-sentenced-death, retrieved 
on 15 April 2009. 
49 Entretien avec Dolkun Isa, Secrétaire Général du Congrès Mondial Ouigour, “Le calvaire 
des Ouigours”, 30 May 2008, www.eurasie.net/webzine/Entretien-avec-Dolkun-Isa.html, 
retrieved 28 April 2009 (author’s translation). 
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Nevertheless, to be truly effective, NGOs should, according to the ACF 
scheme, also enter into coalition with actors from other spheres, that is public/ 
governmental actors and agents from the private sector. On this point, however, the 
civil society groups working on human rights in China seem to lag behind. 
 
3.2  Points of Divergence with the ACF: no Big Platforms, nor Cross-sector Coalitions  
Searching for a way to settle whether NGOs attempting to change or toughen the 
European discourse on human rights in China are effective in doing so, it appears 
necessary to broaden the scope of the first criterion, aligning thus with the initial 
model. Indeed, according to Sabatier, coalition-building, forming a sub-unit 
consisting of “actors from a variety of public and private organisations who are 
actively concerned with a policy problem or issue […] and who regularly seek to 
influence public policy in that domain,”50 is the most effective way of achieving aims 
set when lobbying on specific causes. 
Although this paper exclusively deals with civil society focused on human 
rights, it seems predominant to enlarge the groups studied, in order to evaluate the 
degree of trans-sector coalition-building to civil society engaged with China in 
general. Yet, this underlines the problem of “no unified European civil society and no 
unified perception of China”.51  Indeed, European civil society organisations have 
differing perceptions of China, and the organisations involved can be ranked as 
follows:52 
1) Human rights;  
2) Labour;  
3) Environment; 
4) Education. 
 
This fact illustrates the obstacles standing in the way of NGOs when trying to establish 
effective coalitions across civil society organisations specialised on China. All of them 
would have an interest in tighter cooperation, but the divergences in perceptions 
hinder agreements. Some institutions are in the grey zone between civil society, 
academia and the private sector and are trying to obtain better coordination 
between the different groups, such as the European Economic and Social 
                                                 
50 Sabatier, op.cit., p. 7. 
51 N. Sausmikat, Civil Society Dilemmas in Dealing with China, EU-China Civil Society Forum, 22 
March 2009, www.eu-china.net/web/cms/front_content.php, retrieved 6 April 2009. 
52 Ibid. 
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Committee, a “bridge for organised civil society”,53 the China-Europe Forum,54 which 
focuses on various societal groups including civil society, and Academia Sinica 
Europaea (ASE),55 an intellectual interface between China and Europe.56 
Still, the coalition criterion understood in the broadest sense does not seem to 
apply to the situation of NGOs attempting to influence the EU institutions when 
promoting human rights in China. If the various NGOs tend to aggregate, at least in 
gathering information, they remain confined to the sphere of interest groups working 
with human rights and only do little to open up to the private sector. There might 
have been attempts in this direction, but even if this is the case, they have never 
been fully accomplished due to differing perceptions and contradictory prioritisa-
tions of interests. This is, for instance, the case between human rights NGOs and the 
EU (see below). Hence, it is questionable whether adding more actors would do 
anything but complicate the picture further. 
In this perspective, Dirk Sterckx from the European Parliament stresses the 
existence of what he calls a “huge lobby on China”,57 stemming not only from NGOs, 
but  “also from the business community [...] leading to rather contradictory forces 
within China lobbying in the EU”.58  Ultimately then, coalition-building is seen as a 
valuable means if one is to assert genuine influence on the EU institutions. However, 
the hurdle of divergent perceptions and interests is yet to be overcome. 
 
4.  The EU Discourse on Human Rights in China and NGO Objectives: 
Divergences or Similarities?  
 
4.1  Partial Agreement on the Rights in Focus 
As a general remark, there seems to be a rather good convergence between the EU 
institutions and NGOs, in particular when it comes to the choice of human rights to 
highlight. EU officials appear very satisfied with the degree of similarity between the 
overall objectives: “priorities are similar between the EU and the NGOs present in 
Brussels: ratification of the ICCPR, death penalty, torture, detention, re-education 
through labour, Charter 08, calling for release of leader Liu Xiaobiao, freedom of 
expression, state secrecy legislation, censorship of internet, Tibet and Xinjiang, 
                                                 
53 The European Economic and Social Committee, homepage www.eesc.europa.eu/ 
index_en.asp , retrieved 15 April 2009. 
54 China-Europe Forum, www.china-europaforum.net, retrieved 15 April 2009. 
55 Academia Sinica Europaea, www.ceibs.edu/ase/ASE.htm, retrieved 15 April 2009. 
56 EU-China Civil Society Forum, op.cit. 
57 D. Sterckx, “Debriefing of the European Parliament’s Recent Visit to China”, Brussels Institute 
of Contemporary Chinese Studies (BICCS), Brussels, 30 April 2009. 
58 Ibid. 
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freedom of religion, labour rights and children and women rights are issues we all 
intend to work on and improve”.59 
Nevertheless, NGOs stress the importance of basic rights, the so-called ‘human 
security concept’60 which, although far from being new within the EU,61 remains 
rather marginal on the agenda of the Union. Indeed, where many NGOs call for a 
focus on economic and social rights, the EU appears to persist in privileging political 
and civil rights, seemingly forgetting that the latter solely ‘arrived’ on the Old 
Continent after the well-establishment of the former. This is not saying that the EU 
should accept any ‘langue de bois’ from China; but simply that it is questionable 
whether isolating a few rights from the broad range existing is fruitful. 
In this perspective, Dirk Sterckx has an interesting point of view: the EU “should 
never be humble”,62 but instead recognise that China and Europe have different 
ways of approaching human rights and adapt its political discourse on that basis in 
order to achieve progress across the spectrum of human rights. China persists in 
arguing that the EU system is not suitable for the Middle Kingdom as it is diametrically 
opposed to the highly praised Chinese principle of stability. Hence, Sterckx finds that 
the EU, instead of referring to ‘European democracy’, should translate the concept 
to other terms, such as accountability and rule of law. Thus, without neglecting the 
urgent need to act on individual rights abuses in China, the EU would show will to 
cooperate and understanding of a system different from its own. There seems to be 
a general demand for an adjustment of expectations to reality. 
Finally, if a partial convergence on objectives seems to exist, little coherence is 
to be found, especially within the EU. Frequent policy papers63 underline a slight 
confusion, which rejoins the ever-returning criticism of the incapability of the EU to 
‘speak with one voice’. Yet, this EU default remains but one of the sources of 
disagreement between the institutions and the human-rights focused civil society. 
                                                 
59 Interview with a Commission Official, Brussels, 24 March 2009. 
60 M. Ul Haq, Pakistani economist who invented the notion, see definition at the Human 
Security Centre, www.humansecurityreport.info/index.php?option=content&task=view&id= 
24&Itemid=59, retrieved 20 April 2009. 
61 As underlined in an interview by G. Harris, Head of Human Rights Unit, European Parliament, 
Brussels, 16 March 2009. 
62 Sterckx, op.cit. 
63 There are currently five major EU policy papers concerning relations with China. For more 
information, see http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/china/intro/index.htm, 10 
March 2009. 
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4.2  Disagreement on Methods and Pace of Involvement 
When it comes to the underlying strategies to employ, NGOs and EU institutions are 
far from being in line.  
First, there is a clear disagreement on the methods used in promoting human 
rights towards China. Primo, the definition of the scope of rights to cover does not 
find consensus. NGOs blame the institutions for being “blind folded”64 and for 
restricting their human rights policy solely to political and civil rights. Willy Fautré from 
HRWF stresses that “NGOs and the EU should reprioritise the causes defended: 
freedom of expression is not primordial for someone who does not even possess a 
computer or knows how to write”.65 Echoed by many other organisations, he 
underlines that both the institutions and, to a certain extent, the NGOs should focus 
more on housing, land, working conditions and the legal system. It is, indeed, 
important to assist people who then, in return, might begin to understand what 
human rights in essence are. Secundo, transparency, publicity and assessment of the 
policies in place, most particularly the Human Rights Dialogue is a point of 
disagreement. The NGOs call for opening the so far shut doors and inviting civil 
society to participate in assessments held in public. The COHOM evaluates the 
Dialogue, but has, up till now “brought no new analysis or inputs”.66 Tertio, there is a 
rather strong divergence to be found on the issue of whether to politicise the 
Dialogue or rather keep it in the ‘dialogue box’67. Mainstreaming human rights, 
through cross-pillarisation is also a possibility. “Human rights should not be put in a 
box, but also discussed at political summits”68, according to RSF. The criticisms are 
clear: “the EU is not united enough, not strong enough, not determined enough [...] 
the EU needs to speak with one voice”.69  According to the NGOs, there are no 
documents which clearly state the position of the EU, which thereby pushes NGOs 
“to act on a case-to-case basis”.70 
Second, there is a tangible disagreement on the pace to adopt. Many of the 
actors involved highlighted the fortuitous moment represented by the years 2008-09, 
years of anniversaries and commemorations. They therefore pledged for stronger 
action, especially in order to persist in marking the 60th anniversary of the Universal 
                                                 
64 Interview with O. Basille, RSF, op.cit. 
65 Interview with W. Fautré, HRWF, op.cit. 
66 Interview with S. Dennission, AI, op.cit. 
67 G. Harris, European Parliament. He also talks about a ‘stylized ballet’; interview in Brussels, 16 
March 2009. 
68 Interview with O. Basille, RSF, op.cit. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Interview with V. Metten, ICT, op.cit. 
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Declaration of Human Rights (1948-2008), the 20-year-anniversary of the Tiananmen 
massacre and the Tibetan upheaval of 2008. However, some members of NGOs 
appear to believe that notwithstanding these facts, the “moment was left 
unseized”..71 Indeed, after the little efforts shown by the EU during the Olympic 
Games in Beijing, RSF, for instance, notes that it is too late to do more.72 In sum, many 
NGOs express their concern over the EU having given up on human rights, favouring 
instead trade and economic ties.  
 
5.  Impact of NGOs and Case Studies: Variable Degrees of Receptiveness 
 
5.1  Reflection of the Work of NGOs in Official Statements  
Main points raised by NGOs, such as rule of law, transparency and accountability 
are to be found in official documents emanating from the EU institutions. These 
concepts are, on the one hand, being called upon by NGOs and academia, and 
on the other hand, the same concepts are equally asked for by the Chinese 
authorities which, according to former Chairman of the European Parliament’s China 
Delegation, Dirk Sterckx, think that it is in the “interest of China to work more 
persistently on accountability and the rule of law”.73 Incentives for EU encourage-
ments in these areas are thus present.  
In the 2006 Commission Communication EU-China: Closer Partners, Growing 
Responsibilities,  the Commission furthermore stressed its strong commitment to 
“support efforts to strengthen the rule of law – an essential basis for all other 
reforms”.74 As for transparency and accountability, the EU equally appears to be 
receptive to NGO demands. Undeniably, in its Guidelines on Human Rights 
Dialogues, the Commission argues that “the EU will as far as possible give the Human 
Rights Dialogues a degree of genuine transparency vis-à-vis civil society”.75 Similarly, 
in its 2003 Communication Maturing Partnership - Shared Interests and Challenges in 
EU-China Relations, the Commission explicitly commits itself to “give as much visibility 
                                                 
71 Interview with O. Basille, RSF, op. cit. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Sterckx, op.cit. 
74 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament. EU – China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities, 
COM(2006) 631 final, Brussels, 24 October 2006, p. 12. 
75 Commission of the European Communities, European Union Guidelines on Human Rights 
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and transparency  [emphasis added]  as possible to the Dialogue, e.g. by briefing 
press, civil society and the European Parliament after each session”.76  
The EU’s de facto degree of receptiveness varies on a case-by-case basis 
(Tibet, Xinjiang, Charter 08, Falun Gong, etc.), but in general it can be argued that it 
more or less follows its statements – yet not always to the extent described below. 
 
5.2  The Case of Hu Jia, Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought 2008 
In the case of Hu Jia, the three criteria established at the beginning of the paper are 
confirmed. Hu Jia, fighting for more respect for human rights, amongst others for AIDS 
patients, “was taken from his home in Beijing by police on 27 December 2007 on 
charges of inciting subversion”.77 After heavy lobbying from RSF, supported by the 
Greens and the British Conservatives78 within the European Parliament, Hu Jia 
received the European Parliament Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought79 in 
December 2008 for his fight for increased respect for human rights.  
NGOs were quick to get engaged on the case and put a lot of effort in 
briefing the EU institutions in the hope of condemnatory action. The European 
Parliament responded promptly with a joint resolution on 17 January 2008, 
“strongly condemn[ing] the detention of Hu Jia and demand[ing] his 
prompt release and that of all the dissidents who ha[d] been arrested and 
jailed for crimes of opinion […] call[ing] upon China to respect its 
commitments to Human Rights and the rule of law […] by putting an end 
to the harassment of Chinese Human Rights defenders, in order to 
demonstrate its commitment to Human Rights in its Olympic year.” 80 
 
Among the NGOs engaged on the case, HRW was markedly active. The organisation 
had “long argued that Hu’s arrest in December 2007 was politically motivated and 
that his trial did not meet minimum standards of fairness and due process”.81  
                                                 
76 Commission of the European Communities, Commission Policy Paper for the Transmission to 
the Council and the European Parliament, A Maturing Partnership - Shared Interests and 
Challenges in EU-China Relations, COM(2003) 533 final, Brussels, 10 September 2003. 
77 European Parliament, News Release, 17 January 2007, www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
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78 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 16 March 2009. 
79 For more information  on the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, see 
www.europarl.europa.eu/comparl/afet/droi/sakharov/default.htm, retrieved 28 March 2009. 
80 European Parliament resolution on the arrest of the Chinese dissident Hu Jia, 17 January 
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In sum, several NGOs worked on the case of Hu Jia and managed to convey 
the necessary information to the institutions, of which the European Parliament was 
the most receptive; all of it in a coherent mode. As for the reception by the Chinese 
authorities, it is questionable whether they actually understood the resolution or the 
award issued by the European Parliament. Indeed, according to Dirk Sterckx, “Hu Jia 
is completely mysterious to China”.82 Since the Chinese Parliament never issues 
statements on the EU, it remains a puzzle to Beijing that the EU does so on China.  
 
5.3  Interest Prioritising within the EU 
NGO influence is without doubt retained by the overall EU receptiveness to human 
rights issues. The European institutions are, indeed, to a large extent preoccupied 
with trade and economic matters, allocating significantly less importance to ‘softer’ 
areas of cooperation. As put forth by Jonathan Holslag, in eight EU joint statements 
on China, the clauses introduced predominantly lean toward economic 
prioritisation.83 He categorises the different clauses according to five main sectors: 
“45.3 percent relates to the economic sector, 19.3 percent to the political-diplomatic 
sector, 18.6 percent to the security sector, 8.6 percent to the rule of law, and 8 
percent to environmental protection”.84 To NGOs this fact represents an additional 
obstacle to influence the institutions. Indeed, if the EU ranks other issues higher, the 
lobbying on human rights needs to be all the more powerful, and in that respect it is 
important to keep in mind the complexity of “the European international actorness 
[… a] dynamic combination of the three types of policy, namely the CFSP [Common 
Foreign and Security Policy], the EC and the member state levels, which interact 
within the European system of external relations”.85 It is thus not only EU interest 
prioritisation, ranking economic agreements highest, which is complicating the work 
of NGOs, but also differences in interests among the member states.  
A noteworthy amount of realism and pragmatism prevail in the EU’s approach 
to promoting human rights in China. If human rights were mainstreamed, and not 
kept in a ‘dialogue box’, tangible results would more likely be within reach.  
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5.4  EU-China: the Great Disillusion?86  
Underneath the European attitude described above lies a “stubborn belief that [the 
EU] can socialize China”.87 According to Holslag, “the EU still assumes that by 
entangling the Asian power into a web of international institutions and rules, Beijing 
will adopt the norms that Europe has enshrined in its own political charters”.88 It is the 
“conflict between China’s preference for realism and the EU’s penchant for 
normative power”89 which at present impedes genuine dialogue and substantial 
results in the field of human rights. Besides, it is the same quarrel which reduces the 
receptiveness of the EU to NGO input, however united and coherent it may be. If the 
EU ceases to pretend to be morally superior it might open up to both NGOs and 
Chinese reality.  
 
5.5  How to Overcome the Constraints? Policy Recommendations 
“A relationship that is limited to praise would not amount to much”.90 This statement 
indicates the risk of engaging with a partner without any critical outlook or firm stand. 
When it comes to the European attitude towards China, such a risk seems to be 
lurking between the lines of every resolution, joint communiqué or official declara-
tion. “Europe is developing its relations with China in a strategic vacuum […] it 
pretends to be a solid partner for China, but in reality it only excels in the declaratory 
ambivalence that is used to cover up the lack of internal consensus”.91 
To overcome China’s Realpolitik, the EU needs to overcome that of its own 
member states and to unify its voice. Hence, the EU institutions, its staff to be more 
precise, need to be better informed on China. Closer cooperation with NGOs on the 
issue could fill this gap, perhaps by establishing a more formal coalition between the 
EU institutions, academia and civil society and maybe the private sector. 
Roundtables, “involving scholars, think tanks, journalists, business leaders and 
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officials”,92 could equally be organised on a more regular basis in the member states, 
providing “the opportunity to interpret China’s rise from a national perspective and 
to raise support for a coherent European position”.93 Indeed, to set up a well-built 
European human rights policy towards China should be an exercise founded on 
bottom-up legitimacy, not only on technocratic steering.94 Hence, NGOs should 
increasingly centre their efforts on strategy, aiming at  better coalitions and 
convergence on objectives.  They should furthermore work steadily on increasing 
their knowledge of China, and hence their own receptiveness of the human rights 
issues in the country in order to subsequently increase that of the EU. 
Finally, the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue should be opened up, surpassed, 
so that human rights discussions no longer remain behind closed doors – in the 
‘dialogue box’ – but instead are mainstreamed into high-level political discussions. 
With the EU relegating responsibility for the legal expert seminars to academia (Irish 
Institute for Human Rights, Galway, since spring 2009), opinions are mixed on the 
issue. To academia95 the move is positive, yet some NGOs96 seem to think the 
opposite, feeling pushed even further away from the decision-making process. 
Amnesty International finds the depoliticisation acceptable – it will most probably 
allow for greater room for open discussions – but notes that the switch in responsibility 
might entail practical problems.97 
In sum, the tight spot on the issue of human rights in China is that the will to 
change to a large extent seems confined to NGOs and the ‘NGO-like services’ of 
the EU institutions. Both appear to work together rather closely, but the influence of 
NGOs is only conveyed in a limited manner to the higher instances of decision-
making. 
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6.  Conclusions: Back to the ‘Ground’? 
 
“Comment imaginer l’avenir sans connaître le passé ?” 
Jacques Delors98 
 
“How to imagine the future, without knowledge of the past?”99 Thus spoke one of the 
most prominent Presidents of the European Commission, and both the EU institutions 
and NGOs active in the field of promoting and defending human rights in China 
seem to think and act in accordance. Guideline for Jacques Delors100, the sentence 
seems to fit the arguments of this paper. The influence of NGOs on the EU decision-
making framework of promoting human rights in China has increased over recent 
years, exactly because the EU has taken up the challenge to take an in-depth look 
into history. Indeed, when acknowledging the need for further democratic 
legitimacy, the initially technocratic EU has begun to increasingly take input from civil 
society into account, in order to move forward in a more constructive way. ‘With a 
little help’ in form of expertise from NGOs, the EU at present appears to be able to 
build a genuine position on the issue. Indeed, although the EU has “little leverage 
regarding the human and civic rights of Chinese citizens”,101 this paper has clearly 
argued that it should nevertheless refrain from silence. However, the EU “desperately 
needs to bolster the credibility of its approach”,102 to stand by the lessons learned in 
terms of legitimacy, and progressively begin to enlarge its human rights policy 
towards China beyond the current “discreet official channels and informal dialogues 
[taking place] behind closed doors”.103 
First, it has been argued that notwithstanding the initial hypothesis, NGOs 
know whom to address and where to turn in order to influence the EU decision-
making framework of promoting human rights in China. This is due to a rather well-
established dialogue which, if not yet perfect, allows for inputs from civil society. 
Subsequently, the paper relied on a three-dimensional tool, based on Sabatier’s ACF 
model, so as to verify the effectiveness of the methods employed by NGOs in 
broader terms. The first criterion, coalition-building, clearly applied, but NGOs should 
strive more in this direction to increase their influence. However, NGOs have, like the 
EU, been lurking through the ‘looking-glass’, to paraphrase Carroll Lewis famous 
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book104, and have evidently attempted to enact the lessons taught by the past. They 
have “increasingly realised the importance of organising themselves in coherent 
alliances in order to gain influence within the EU”,105 such as the one embodied by 
the FIDH. Indeed, “whilst seeking to safeguard their independence, many NGOs 
have acknowledged that positive changes within the EU can only be achieved 
through common campaigning, and consistent dialogue”.106 If their methods remain 
incomplete, such inadequacies seem to be easily surmounted, for instance by 
creating a platform for human rights NGOs working particularly on the Chinese 
situation – perhaps within the existing HRDN. 
Second, the convergence between NGOs and the EU institutions on human 
rights as well as the overall coherence in strategies and objectives were analysed. It 
was found that there is a partial convergence, with internal confusions existing on 
each side, reducing the level of influence on China. The core division between 
NGOs and the EU was particularly visible on this point. Indeed, the EU is bound by 
Realpolitik, that is, a fear of being over-taken by China if it does not comply with 
‘unconditional engagement’.107 The NGOs are much freer, but without much 
leverage, given the position of the EU. The paper argued that a change in Chinese 
mentality108 on the issue, allowing for a change within the EU institutions, constitutes a 
prerequisite for success.  
Finally, the degree of receptiveness of both NGOs and the EU to China as well 
as of the EU to NGOs was examined. It was argued that NGOs need to enlarge and 
reinforce their knowledge about China in general in order to influence the EU 
institutions. In sum, the receptiveness of NGOs to China is not the key issue – enlarging 
knowledge and recruiting appropriate staff, in terms of expertise, does not seem out 
of reach –, but it is rather the receptiveness of the EU, primo to NGOs, and secundo 
to China, which urgently should be modified. Civil society, “catalyst of public opinion 
[...] can and does influence the political process, but [...] it can only do so when the 
political parties are themselves convinced by the arguments put forward”.109 Hence, 
different priority-ranking needs to be put forth in the European CFSP if tangible results 
in the field of human rights in third countries are to be accomplished. Conceding 
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that this, in today’s world setting, is quite unlikely to occur, a possible solution could 
be that of progressively mainstreaming human rights into all aspects of EU-China 
relations in order for them to be eventually discussed at high-level meetings. To 
achieve such a goal will most likely imply engaging in a marathon, but it is widely 
known that the satisfaction for the long-distance runner after having covered the 
Olympic distance is tremendous. 
As for the failure to comply with the third criterion, the hurdle appears to be 
more difficult to surpass. Concerning the EU’s attitude towards China, it has been 
argued throughout the paper that it is ‘stuck in the past’ – if only it was so in a 
constructive way, as implied by the sentence by Delors, the results would be there. 
However, it was shown that this is not the case. Indeed, when putting on the 
moralising coat of the one who knows better, the EU instantly splinters the efforts 
made by NGOs, as China evidently strongly resists to such a fashion in garments.  
The ‘grand theories of Western democratisation’110 do not find benevolent 
ground in China; the EU should in all probability change its approach in institution- 
and capacity-building. Even here, “the implications are not always clear cut […] 
Europeans have largely accepted relatively close scrutiny from the Public Security 
Bureau and restrictions on which civil society groups can be involved in promoting 
democratic governance”.111 The key requirement for the EU on the issue seems to be 
“thinking realistically about expectations”. 112  
In sum, if the EU is to have any impact on the future developments in respect 
to human rights in China, it must, first of all, “meet one of the key objectives laid out 
at Laeken in December 2001 – to engage citizens with the EU project [that is, let] 
European civil society [...] play a key role”.113 Subsequently, it should endeavour to 
change its approach towards China more generally speaking. Not its goals, simply its 
attitude. European civil society engaged in the field of human rights in China is 
striving to make its recommendations heard. Success on this point can only be 
achieved with adequate support from the EU institutions. Hence, this paper calls, in 
line with Giampiero Alhadeff and Simon Wilson, for “a structured civil Dialogue – 
                                                 
110 S. Breslin, Democratising One-Party Rule? Political Reform, Nationalism and Legitimacy in 
the People’s Republic of China, Working Paper, no. 67, September 2008, Madrid, Fundacion 
para las relaciones internacionales y el dialogo exterior (FRIDE), www.fride.org/descarga/ 
WP67_China_one_party_ENG2_sep08.pdf, retrieved 20 February 2009. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Fox & Godement, op.cit., p. 17. 
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established with a legal base in the Treaties – [which] would clearly guarantee a role 
for civil society [...] and would help to reinvigorate” EU-China relations.114  
“When you have faults, do not fear to abandon them”.115 This quotation from 
Confucius completes the circle sketched by the initial sentence of Jacques Delors. 
Indeed, in order to advance in the area of promoting human rights in China, it is 
predominant to acknowledge the past, so as to leave errors behind and 
constructively move ahead. 
 
                                                 
114 G. Alhadeff & S. Wilson, European Civil Society Coming of Age, op.cit. 
115 Confucius, The Confucian Analects,  b o o k  1 ,  t r a n s l a t e d  b y  J a m e s  L e g g e ,  
eBooks@Adelaide, 2004, ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/c/confucius/c748a, retrieved 2 May 2009. 
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